Live board · odds as of 2026-10-25 14:30 UTC (live)
Live geopolitical risk dashboard: war odds vs markets
Geopolitical risk, priced. Every morning.
By Net Jacobsson · X · LinkedIn
SHORT ANSWER
As of 2026-10-25 04:36 UTC, GeoShockBoard tracks 5 live flashpoints. Our widest gap with Polymarket is “Will the U.S. invade Iran before 2027?”: crowd 20.0%, ours 5%. Of 39 past geopolitical shocks in our dataset, 37 have oil data; their median 5-session oil move was +0.20%. Market context, not investment advice.
WHAT I'D CHANGE MY MIND ON
- Hormuz reopening. If Kpler's 7-day Hormuz average is at or above 14,000 kbd for two consecutive briefings (dataset: Kpler media briefings; last print 12,653 kbd, flows as of 21 Oct), I'd raise my 8% call that Hormuz traffic is back to normal by Dec 31.
- Red Sea spreading. If UKMTO confirms a Houthi hit on a merchant ship that isn't Saudi-linked (dataset: UKMTO weekly overview; none as of 23 Oct), I'd raise my 10% call that Bab el-Mandeb is effectively closed by Dec 31.
- Ukraine talks with teeth. If the trilateral talks convene with a written ceasefire-sequencing document (dataset: wire reporting on the Abu Dhabi talks; no document as of this week), I'd raise my 10% call on a ceasefire agreement by Dec 31.
Odds snapshot as of 2026-10-25 14:30 UTC (live) (Polymarket; ours = GeoShockBoard judgment)
US/Israel–Iran: ceasefire & Strait of Hormuz
- US-Iran ceasefire continues through...? — December 31: crowd …, GeoShockBoard 20%
- Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by December 31?: crowd …, GeoShockBoard 8%
- Will the U.S. invade Iran before 2027?: crowd …, GeoShockBoard 5%
Red Sea / Bab el-Mandeb: Houthi–Saudi war
- Bab el-Mandeb Strait effectively closed by...? — December 31: crowd …, GeoShockBoard 10%
- Saudi-Houthi ceasefire agreement announced by...? — December 31: crowd …, GeoShockBoard 15%
- Perim Island no longer under Houthi control by...? — December 31: crowd …, GeoShockBoard 20%
Israel–Hezbollah & the 27 Oct Israeli election
- Israel military action against Beirut by...? — October 31: crowd …, GeoShockBoard 10%
- Will Hezbollah disarm by...? — December 31: crowd …, GeoShockBoard 3%
- Prime Minister of Israel after the next election? — Gadi Eizenkot: crowd …, GeoShockBoard no view
Russia–Ukraine: talks track vs strike war
- Russia x Ukraine ceasefire agreement by...? — December 31: crowd …, GeoShockBoard 10%
- Russia x Ukraine peace talks by...? — November 30: crowd …, GeoShockBoard 70%
- Ukraine signs peace deal with Russia before 2027?: crowd …, GeoShockBoard 5%
Taiwan Strait & AI-chip controls
- Will China blockade Taiwan in 2026?: crowd …, GeoShockBoard 2%
- China x Taiwan military clash before 2027?: crowd …, GeoShockBoard 4%
- Will China invade Taiwan by end of 2026?: crowd …, GeoShockBoard 1%
Live flashpoints · prediction-market odds · game-theory reads · what history says markets do next. Odds refresh live from Polymarket; prices are a snapshot at build time.
Market context, not investment advice. "Crowd" figures are Polymarket prices. "Ours" figures are GeoShockBoard judgment and are logged on the track record. Historical base rates describe the past, have small samples, and do not predict future moves.
01 · Live situations odds live from Polymarket · 17/17 markets · updated 16:30:30 IDT
/s/iran SEVERE
US/Israel–Iran: ceasefire & Strait of Hormuz
Ceasefire still nominally holding; Trump says he could strike Iran 'tomorrow' or reach 'a beautiful deal'; Iran sets seven conditions before reopening Hormuz; Istanbul group of eight urges reopening.
GAP -14.5 PTS: we put "US invades Iran before 2027" at 5% vs the crowd's 19.5%
| Scenario | Crowd | Ours* | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| US–Iran ceasefire holds through Dec 31 Reported US–Israeli strike plans for after the midterms, Trump's 'fairly soon', and a mine-and-strike campaign in the strait make a clean run to Dec 31 less likely than the crowd prices. | … | 20% | — |
| Hormuz traffic back to normal by Dec 31 | … | 8% | — |
| US invades Iran before 2027 Invasion is a far higher bar than strikes; the attrition logic and a reported US troop drawdown point to coercion from the sea and air, not ground entry. | … | 5% | — |
Crowd = Polymarket "Yes" price, live 16:30:30 IDT. *Ours = GeoShockBoard judgment, not a market price.
What would change my mind: A dated, sequenced deal text published by a mediator (Pakistan or Qatar), or a public US statement shelving post-midterm strike plans. A US strike before 3 Nov would mean the midterm brake has failed.
Killer tests (missing data = not met)
| Hormuz flows recover Kpler 7-day Hormuz average ≥14,000 kbd for 2 consecutive prints (now 12,653 kbd, 23 Oct briefing; pre-war 17,147) Kpler media briefing, 23 Oct: 7-day average 12,653 kbd (74% of pre-war), down from 13,047 T1 | NOT MET |
| Ceasefire broken US air or missile strike impacting Iranian territory (Polymarket resolution definition) Polymarket US–Iran ceasefire market T2 | NOT MET |
| Mine or sinking inside the strait Confirmed mine strike or vessel sunk inside the Strait of Hormuz IMO confirmed incidents: GFS PRIDE sunk in the Strait of Hormuz, 13 Oct (IRGC mine claims of 22 Oct unverified) T1 | MET |
IF IT ESCALATES, HISTORY SAYS (+5 sessions, median across Strike exchange + War outbreak analogs)
| Oil | Gold | ITA | SPX | VIX pts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| -0.84% ↑47% n=17 | -0.20% ↑47% n=17 | +1.74% ↑73% n=15 | -0.79% ↑42% n=19 | +1.55 ↑63% n=19 |
- Iran: Hormuz is its only leverage that scales. Reopening too early gives up the blockade and sanctions concessions, so it holds out for a package.
- US: Wants the strait open without paying up front. Indirect talks via Pakistan and Qatar continue, with extra US terms; midterms on Nov 3 raise the cost of an oil spike.
- Israel: Election on Oct 27. Maximalist rhetoric is cheap now; the costly option (renewed strikes) waits for the post-election coalition.
- Gulf/Asia buyers: Use bypass routes (Fujairah, Red Sea) and Saudi spot cargoes. They gain from any deal and lose most from a renewed tanker war.
War of attrition under one-sided uncertainty. Iran's resolve is private, so each tanker attack is a costly signal of its type. Its 7-day plan asks the US to move first (lift the blockade before the day-6 reopening), which Washington rejects because reopening can be reversed overnight. A deal needs simultaneous, divisible steps, such as partial blockade relief against verified transits, or a guarantor whose own payoff is hostage (Pakistan, Qatar). China, as the marginal buyer, gains from any reopening. Base case: no deal before the 3 Nov midterms, and the post-midterm window is still the main strike risk (the IDF chief reportedly sees no need to strike before Israel's 27 Oct vote, while US envoy Barrack's 'this weekend' remark is cheap talk until matched by deployments); Iran's threat to hit Gulf datacentres and cables is a bid to make the Gulf states lobby Washington against it. [inference]
What changed this week (source tiers)
- Trump (24 Oct): the US 'could strike Iran tomorrow, or strike a beautiful deal'; US military options are reported ready pending White House authorization. No strike announced as of this refresh. source T2
- SNSC secretary Mohsen Rezaei: Iran will not reopen Hormuz or resume talks until seven new conditions conveyed via mediators are implemented; warns cables, regional data centers and AI facilities could be targeted if war resumes. source T3
- Pezeshkian blames Washington for the interim deal's collapse but says both sides should return and conclude it; IRGC warns even limited strikes would bring a response 'several times greater'. source T2
- Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, UK, France, Germany and Italy met in Istanbul (23 Oct) and called for Hormuz to reopen; Fidan: a new attack on Iran would widen the war. source T2
- Brent settled at $116.72 on 23 Oct, up $3.55 (3.14%), highest since 29 April; up 6% on the week (Reuters). source T2
- US ambassador Tom Barrack: 'Could there be a strike this weekend? Absolutely'; Trump: 'I don't know anything about that'. Trump separately asked whether to 'finish it off or just let it wither'. source T2
T1 primary data · T2 wire or major outlet · T3 partisan or single-source
Change log
- 2026-10-22: Crowd odds only (v2) → First GeoShockBoard weights and killer tests published. v3 schema: own weights, falsifiable killers, change log
- 2026-10-23: US–Iran ceasefire holds through Dec 31: 30 → 20. Detailed post-midterm US–Israeli strike plans reported; Trump says action 'fairly soon'; IMO confirms a sinking inside the strait. src
/s/redsea SEVERE
Red Sea / Bab el-Mandeb: Houthi–Saudi war
Houthi missile fire on Saudi cities continues (24 Oct: Riyadh, Taif, Yanbu; debris near Mecca); shipping itself still untouched per UKMTO; Egypt's parliament votes 26 Oct.
No ≥10-pt gap with the crowd today.
| Scenario | Crowd | Ours* | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bab el-Mandeb effectively closed by Dec 31 | … | 10% | — |
| Saudi–Houthi ceasefire announced by Dec 31 Houthi strikes on Saudi airports and Aramco, and a likely Egyptian commitment on 26 Oct, raise both sides' cost of backing down before the coast is settled. | … | 15% | — |
| Perim Island out of Houthi control by Dec 31 | … | 20% | — |
Crowd = Polymarket "Yes" price, live 16:30:30 IDT. *Ours = GeoShockBoard judgment, not a market price.
What would change my mind: A UKMTO-confirmed hit on a non-Saudi hull, or Egypt's parliament voting no.
Killer tests (missing data = not met)
| JMIC threat level falls JMIC rates Bab el-Mandeb below SUBSTANTIAL UKMTO weekly overview, 23 Oct: JMIC rates southern Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden SUBSTANTIAL T1 | NOT MET |
| War-risk premium normalizes A wire quote puts the Saudi-linked war-risk premium near 1% of hull value Last quote is stale (Reuters, 24 Sep, per Two Straits) T2 | NOT MET |
| Saudi-linked tankers transit Saudi-linked tankers resume southbound Bab el-Mandeb transits No confirming data this week T2 | NOT MET |
| Generalization trigger (escalation) UKMTO-confirmed Houthi hit on a non-Saudi-linked merchant hull UKMTO weekly overview, 23 Oct: no Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb attacks on shipping since 24 Aug T1 | NOT MET |
IF IT ESCALATES, HISTORY SAYS (+5 sessions, median across Shipping/energy hit analogs)
| Oil | Gold | ITA | SPX | VIX pts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| +3.08% ↑86% n=7 | +0.95% ↑86% n=7 | +0.84% ↑86% n=7 | +0.75% ↑57% n=7 | +0.75 ↑57% n=7 |
- Houthis: Selective blockade: hit Saudi-linked targets and leave most traffic alone, which keeps the leverage without uniting the world against them.
- Saudi Arabia: Retake the coast and nodes like Perim and Mocha to remove the leverage at its source, and recruit Egypt to share the cost.
- Egypt: Suez revenue depends on a calm strait, but entering the war means an open-ended commitment.
- Carriers: Fuel and congestion costs favor Suez; one strike on a container ship reverses that calculation.
A discriminating blockade. Narrow targeting of Saudi-linked ships keeps a wider coalition from forming against the Houthis, which is calibrated, selective violence (Dixit & Nalebuff, brinkmanship [inference on fit]). Egypt is not a free actor: it is the Saudi coalition's marginal member, and a 'yes' vote on 26 Oct turns its threat into a commitment (Schelling's burning bridges). The equilibrium breaks if the Houthis hit a non-Saudi hull, because carriers would then re-price the whole strait.
What changed this week (source tiers)
- Coalition (24 Oct): intercepted Houthi ballistic missiles toward Riyadh, Taif and Yanbu and a drone over the Eastern Province; brief alerts in Mecca, Jeddah, Taif and Yanbu. source T2
- Saudi Civil Defense: interception debris fell in Wadi Al-Mughammas (about 20 km from Mecca's Grand Mosque), Jeddah's Al-Nuzha, Taif and Rabigh; no casualties reported. source T1
- Coalition intercepted a Houthi ballistic missile toward Riyadh and another toward Khamis Mushait on 23 Oct; coalition count for October: at least 14 ballistic missiles and 60+ drones, 24 killed and 374 injured in the kingdom. source T2
- Houthis claim 4 operations in 48h (Defence Ministry Riyadh, Dammam airport, Yanbu Aramco site, Abha airport) and allege a Saudi strike hit an Indian yacht near Zuqar Island with 14 Indians aboard; no Saudi comment (Reuters). source T2
- UKMTO weekly: no attacks on shipping in the Red Sea or Bab el-Mandeb since 24 Aug; JMIC keeps southern Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden at SUBSTANTIAL; Bab el-Mandeb transits 22% below pre-22 Jul. source T1
- Kpler (23 Oct): Red Sea 7-day average 5,134 kbd, about 83% above the 2,804 kbd pre-war baseline, as Saudi exports reroute west. source T1
T1 primary data · T2 wire or major outlet · T3 partisan or single-source
Change log
- 2026-10-22: Crowd odds only (v2) → First GeoShockBoard weights and killer tests published. v3 schema: own weights, falsifiable killers, change log
- 2026-10-23: Saudi–Houthi ceasefire by Dec 31: 20 → 15. Houthi campaign widened to Dammam, Riyadh, Yanbu and Abha; US ordered staff out of Saudi Arabia. src
/s/lebanon ELEVATED
Israel–Hezbollah & the 27 Oct Israeli election
Israeli strikes and demolitions continue in the south; Tampa military talks ended without a monitoring deal; final polls put Eisenkot's Yashar ahead with both blocs short of 61; election 27 Oct.
No ≥10-pt gap with the crowd today.
| Scenario | Crowd | Ours* | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Israeli military action against Beirut by Oct 31 | … | 10% | — |
| Hezbollah disarms by Dec 31 | … | 3% | — |
| Next Israeli PM: Gadi Eizenkot (market label) No independent election view; we defer to the crowd and condition our read on the result. | … | no view | — |
Crowd = Polymarket "Yes" price, live 16:30:30 IDT. *Ours = GeoShockBoard judgment, not a market price.
What would change my mind: UNIFIL-verified Lebanese army seizures of Hezbollah sites, an agreed third-party verification mechanism, or a coalition that commits to the Tampa framework.
Killer tests (missing data = not met)
| Lebanese state costly signal The Lebanese army seizes a named Hezbollah site, verified by UNIFIL or a wire service Algemeiner, citing a Walla security source: the army uncovered a Hezbollah-linked tunnel in Ruwaisat al-Jedida (single-source, not UNIFIL or wire) T3 | PARTIAL |
| Election held on schedule Israeli election held 27 Oct with a result certified Polymarket 'held as scheduled' market; L'Orient Today T2 | PENDING |
IF IT ESCALATES, HISTORY SAYS (+5 sessions, median across Strike exchange analogs)
| Oil | Gold | ITA | SPX | VIX pts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| +1.82% ↑56% n=9 | -0.20% ↑44% n=9 | +1.13% ↑78% n=9 | -1.15% ↑33% n=9 | +1.55 ↑78% n=9 |
- Hezbollah: Rebuild quietly; avoid giving Israel a pretext before the election; keep its veto inside Lebanon.
- Lebanese state (Aoun/Salam): Trade disarmament steps for Israeli withdrawals, but cannot enforce against Hezbollah alone.
- Israel: A pre-election incentive to look strong; after the vote, the coalition decides whether to escalate or bank a deal.
- US: Wants a sequenced framework that it can claim as a win.
The election is the real game, so the read is conditional. Pre-election maximalism is cheap talk (Crawford–Sobel): costless statements that carry little information, which is why the Radar files it as noise. On the ground it is a sequencing problem: neither Hezbollah nor Israel moves first because the first mover bears the risk, and the US 'pilot areas' in Tampa try to split it into small, verifiable steps. The costly signal to watch is the Lebanese state acting against Hezbollah.
If Eisenkot leads the coalition: Lower odds of a pre-emptive Beirut campaign and a higher weight on the US-sequenced framework; Iran posture becomes coalition-dependent.
If Netanyahu forms it: Higher odds of renewed strikes on Beirut and Iran once the coalition is formed; the Lebanon framework is slow-walked.
What changed this week (source tiers)
- Israeli shelling, demolitions and airstrikes continued across southern Lebanon on 24 Oct (Khiam, Kfar Tibnit, Wadi al-Hujeir, Taybeh); bulldozers cutting a road near Shebaa (Lebanese and Hezbollah-aligned media). source T3
- US-sponsored Lebanon–Israel military talks in Tampa closed without a deal: Israel wants a monitoring seat on disarmament, Lebanon wants an independent international body. source T3
- Israeli jets struck al-Deir and Nabatieh al-Fawqa, with shelling and arson of homes and displaced Syrians' tents across the south; no casualties reported. source T2
- Israeli drones flew at low altitude over Beirut and Tyre (Lebanese state media); analysts say it signals pressure, not a confirmed offensive. source T2
- Final pre-election polls: Yashar 22–23 seats, Likud 19–21; change bloc 52–56 vs Netanyahu bloc 50, both short of 61. Poll publication now banned until exit polls on 27 Oct. source T2
- US says UNIFIL 'in its current form will not be maintained' after its mandate ends 31 Dec; Hezbollah bloc repeats it will not disarm under occupation (via L'Orient Today). source T3
T1 primary data · T2 wire or major outlet · T3 partisan or single-source
Change log
- 2026-10-22: Crowd odds only (v2) → First GeoShockBoard weights and killer tests published. v3 schema: own weights, falsifiable killers, change log
/s/russia HIGH
Russia–Ukraine: talks track vs strike war
No ceasefire. Trilateral talks planned for early-to-mid November, likely Abu Dhabi; strikes on energy continue on both sides; the local Oleshky ceasefire now starts 27 Oct.
No ≥10-pt gap with the crowd today.
| Scenario | Crowd | Ours* | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ceasefire agreement by Dec 31 Russia holds the clock and has said it will make no concessions; nothing this week raises its cost of waiting. | … | 10% | — |
| Peace talks held by Nov 30 Both Moscow and Kyiv now name a venue (Abu Dhabi) and window (first half of November); a similar meeting earlier this month never happened, so we stay below the crowd. | … | 70% | — |
| Peace deal signed before 2027 | … | 5% | — |
Crowd = Polymarket "Yes" price, live 16:30:30 IDT. *Ours = GeoShockBoard judgment, not a market price.
What would change my mind: Any Russian territorial concession, even a symbolic one.
Killer tests (missing data = not met)
| Written sequencing document Trilateral talks convene with a written ceasefire-sequencing document Al Jazeera: talks 'planned' for first half of Nov in Abu Dhabi; no written sequencing document T2 | NOT MET |
| US secondary sanctions US secondary sanctions or tariffs on a named major buyer of Russian oil None found this week (missing = not met) T2 | NOT MET |
IF IT ESCALATES, HISTORY SAYS (+5 sessions, median across Sanctions + War outbreak analogs)
| Oil | Gold | ITA | SPX | VIX pts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| -1.23% ↑43% n=14 | -0.57% ↑50% n=14 | +2.45% ↑67% n=12 | -0.01% ↑50% n=16 | +0.80 ↑50% n=16 |
- Russia: Talk to keep the US engaged and sanctions from escalating, while continuing military pressure on the ground.
- Ukraine: Show willingness to talk so it keeps US support; refuse to cede territory.
- US: Wants a deal headline; leverage is sanctions on oil buyers versus Russian diesel waivers.
- Europe: Security guarantees are the price of any freeze.
Cheap talk versus costly signals, and the question is who holds the clock. Russia gains from delay while it advances [inference], so agreeing to talks costs it nothing. Sun Tzu: prolonged war benefits no state, so the test is whose costs are rising faster, through Ukrainian strikes on refineries and ports or US secondary sanctions on oil buyers. Until one of those bites, talks are positioning ahead of the US midterms and the APEC summit; the Oleshky local truce is a cheap, divisible step that tests compliance without touching the front line.
What changed this week (source tiers)
- Oleshky local ceasefire, agreed Friday by Ukrainian, Russian and US negotiators, now reported to start Tuesday 27 Oct for aid deliveries and evacuations (AP, Reuters). source T2
- Novak: first three tankers of Russian diesel are heading to the US east coast under the sanctions-relief fuel deal; one expected 7 Nov (Reuters via Guardian). source T2
- Kremlin spokesman Peskov: trilateral Russia–Ukraine–US talks 'planned for the first half of November in Abu Dhabi'; Zelenskyy confirms technical talks 'as early as possible'. source T2
- Putin: talks should target 'final' peace terms, not a temporary ceasefire. source T2
- Russian strikes on energy sites in six regions cut power to over 500,000 people; Russia says it downed 443 Ukrainian drones overnight. source T2
- White House: Russia and Ukraine agree a localized ceasefire in occupied Oleshky for aid and evacuation, starting 29 Oct. source T1
T1 primary data · T2 wire or major outlet · T3 partisan or single-source
Change log
- 2026-10-22: Crowd odds only (v2) → First GeoShockBoard weights and killer tests published. v3 schema: own weights, falsifiable killers, change log
- 2026-10-24: Peace talks held by Nov 30: 60 → 70. Kremlin and Kyiv confirm trilateral talks planned in Abu Dhabi in the first half of November. src
/s/taiwan WATCH
Taiwan Strait & AI-chip controls
Quiet in the air: no PLA aircraft around Taiwan for four straight daily reports, though ships rose to 5 PLAN plus 8 official on 25 Oct; no named exercise ahead of the PLA's Nov–Dec peak season.
No ≥10-pt gap with the crowd today.
| Scenario | Crowd | Ours* | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| China blockades Taiwan in 2026 | … | 2% | — |
| China–Taiwan military clash before 2027 | … | 4% | — |
| China invades Taiwan by end-2026 | … | 1% | — |
Crowd = Polymarket "Yes" price, live 16:30:30 IDT. *Ours = GeoShockBoard judgment, not a market price.
What would change my mind: A named PLA exercise before APEC, which would mean Beijing is pricing the export rule as a breach.
Killer tests (missing data = not met)
| Named PLA exercise The PLA announces a named exercise around Taiwan (Joint Sword or Strait Thunder series) Taiwan MND daily report 24 Oct: 1 PLAN ship, 5 official ships, no aircraft, no named exercise T1 | NOT MET |
| Rare-earth retaliation A Chinese rare-earth export measure that names Taiwan or the US None found this week (missing = not met) T2 | NOT MET |
IF IT ESCALATES, HISTORY SAYS (+5 sessions, median across Taiwan drills + Export controls/tariffs analogs)
| Oil | Gold | ITA | SPX | VIX pts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| +0.09% ↑57% n=7 | -1.75% ↑43% n=7 | -2.09% ↑29% n=7 | -1.99% ↑29% n=7 | +2.18 ↑71% n=7 |
- China: Signal with drills, calibrated around Lai's statements, the US–China summit calendar and Taiwan's Nov 28 local elections.
- Taiwan: Align with US export controls to secure the trade deal and US backing.
- US: Tighten chip leakage while keeping a Trump–Xi summit on track.
- Chip supply chain: Bears the compliance cost; a blockade is the tail risk.
A linked game. Taiwan's new export controls are a US–Taiwan commitment device (aligning with US rules to secure the trade deal), and Beijing's drill timing is its reply. Drills are cheap, repeated signals timed to political triggers. With APEC Shenzhen on Nov 18–19 and Taiwan's local elections on Nov 28, Beijing has an incentive to hold the largest exercise until after both, unless the export rule takes effect first.
What changed this week (source tiers)
- Taiwan MND (24h to 6am 25 Oct): 5 PLA Navy ships and 8 official ships, no aircraft. source T1
- Taiwan MND (24h to 6am 24 Oct): 1 PLA Navy ship and 5 official ships, no aircraft. source T1
- Taiwan MND (24h to 6am 23 Oct): 3 PLA Navy ships and 7 official ships, no aircraft, as Typhoon Champi passed. source T1
- Month to date, Taiwan has tracked Chinese aircraft 163 times and ships 275 times. source T2
- TSMC is seeking rare-earth-free factory-equipment alternatives to reduce exposure to China's export controls (Reuters). source T2
- Taiwan plans to add AI servers and advanced chips to its export-control list, aligning with US rules; no bill or implementation date yet (Bloomberg Law, 16 Oct). source T2
T1 primary data · T2 wire or major outlet · T3 partisan or single-source
Change log
- 2026-10-22: Crowd odds only (v2) → First GeoShockBoard weights and killer tests published. v3 schema: own weights, falsifiable killers, change log
02 · Catalyst calendar next 60 days · sourced
| Date | In | Catalyst | Situation | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-25 | 0d | Israeli multi-front defence drills in northern and central Israel (Oct 25–26) | Israel–Hezbollah & the 27 Oct Israeli election | link |
| 2026-10-26 | 1d | Egypt parliament votes on military support for Saudi Arabia | Red Sea / Bab el-Mandeb | link |
| 2026-10-27 | 2d | Israeli legislative election | Israel–Hezbollah & the 27 Oct Israeli election | link |
| 2026-10-27 | 2d | Iran's President Pezeshkian at the Gas Exporting Countries Forum summit in Moscow; meeting with Putin expected | US/Israel–Iran | link |
| 2026-10-27 | 2d | Localized Russia–Ukraine ceasefire in Oleshky begins | Russia–Ukraine | link |
| 2026-10-31 | 6d | Polymarket resolution: US–Iran and Israel–Iran ceasefire 'through Oct 31' | US/Israel–Iran | link |
| 2026-11-01 | 7d | OPEC+ (7 countries) monthly meeting on December output | US/Israel–Iran | link |
| 2026-11-03 | 9d | US midterm elections | US/Israel–Iran | link |
| 2026-11-10 | 16d | Earliest date the Kremlin says it would resume trilateral talks | Russia–Ukraine | link |
| 2026-11-11 | 17d | OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report | US/Israel–Iran | link |
| 2026-11-13 | 19d | IEA Oil Market Report | US/Israel–Iran | link |
| 2026-11-15 | 21d | flydubai Tel Aviv suspension runs through at least this date | US/Israel–Iran | link |
| 2026-11-18 | 24d | APEC Leaders' Meeting, Shenzhen (Nov 18–19); Trump–Putin–Xi summit being prepared | Taiwan Strait & AI-chip controls | link |
| 2026-11-28 | 34d | Taiwan local (nine-in-one) elections | Taiwan Strait & AI-chip controls | link |
| 2026-11-29 | 35d | 42nd OPEC and non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting (2027 policy) | US/Israel–Iran | link |
| 2026-11-30 | 36d | Comment deadline: US Munitions List review (DDTC) | Taiwan Strait & AI-chip controls | link |
| 2026-12-11 | 47d | UN 1591 Sudan sanctions expire unless renewed; IEA OMR | Red Sea / Bab el-Mandeb | link |
| 2026-12-14 | 50d | OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report | US/Israel–Iran | link |
| 2026-12-31 | 67d | Polymarket resolution: ceasefire, Hormuz-normal and Bab el-Mandeb markets 'by Dec 31' | Red Sea / Bab el-Mandeb | link |
| 2026-12-31 | 67d | UNIFIL mandate ends; US opposes renewal | Israel–Hezbollah & the 27 Oct Israeli election | link |
03 · Shock playbook base rates · 39 events 1990–2026
Horizon:+1d+5d+20dStat:MedianHit rate
| Asset | War outbreak | Strike exchange | Shipping/energy hit | Sanctions | Export controls/tariffs | Taiwan drills | All events |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil (Brent/WTI) | -1.23% n=8 | +1.82% n=9 | +3.08% n=7 | +0.35% n=6 | +0.16% n=5 | -1.71% n=2 | +0.20% n=37 |
| Gold | -0.54% n=8 | -0.20% n=9 | +0.95% n=7 | -0.57% n=6 | -1.75% n=5 | -0.55% n=2 | +0.25% n=37 |
| US defense (ITA) | +3.45% n=6 | +1.13% n=9 | +0.84% n=7 | +1.99% n=6 | -2.30% n=5 | -1.44% n=2 | +0.84% n=35 |
| US dollar (DXY) | +0.39% n=10 | +0.58% n=9 | +0.12% n=7 | +0.34% n=6 | +0.09% n=5 | +0.36% n=2 | +0.25% n=39 |
| S&P 500 | -0.01% n=10 | -1.15% n=9 | +0.75% n=7 | +0.43% n=6 | -3.58% n=5 | -0.42% n=2 | -0.61% n=39 |
| VIX (pts) | +0.80 n=10 | +1.55 n=9 | +0.75 n=7 | +0.44 n=6 | +3.16 n=5 | +0.32 n=2 | +1.42 n=39 |
| USD/ILS | -0.12% n=6 | +0.32% n=9 | +0.29% n=7 | -0.74% n=6 | +1.51% n=5 | -0.40% n=2 | +0.26% n=35 |
| TA-35 | -1.71% n=8 | +0.25% n=9 | +2.17% n=7 | +0.80% n=6 | -1.87% n=5 | +1.98% n=2 | +0.52% n=37 |
| Semis (SOXX) | -0.78% n=8 | -3.49% n=9 | +0.10% n=7 | -0.66% n=6 | -5.95% n=5 | +0.63% n=2 | -0.82% n=37 |
| Energy (XLE) | +0.02% n=8 | -0.71% n=9 | +0.81% n=7 | +0.81% n=6 | -1.54% n=5 | -2.79% n=2 | +0.11% n=37 |
| TSMC (TSM) | -6.29% n=8 | -3.13% n=9 | -0.15% n=7 | -0.15% n=6 | -6.36% n=5 | -0.08% n=2 | -2.04% n=37 |
| Emerging mkts (EEM) | -1.54% n=6 | -0.76% n=9 | -1.49% n=7 | -1.35% n=6 | -4.48% n=5 | -0.56% n=2 | -1.38% n=35 |
| Airlines (JETS) | -5.19% n=3 | +0.11% n=9 | -1.18% n=7 | -2.62% n=5 | -2.77% n=5 | -0.65% n=2 | -1.33% n=31 |
Each cell is the median move from the last close before the event to the Nth session after (n = sample size; ↑% = share of events where it rose). VIX is in index points; everything else is %. Oil = Brent front-month (BZ=F) from Aug 2007, WTI (CL=F) before that. USD/ILS up = weaker shekel.
Full event dataset (39 events) with per-event moves and sources
Oil (Brent/WTI)GoldUS defense (ITA)US dollar (DXY)S&P 500VIX (pts)USD/ILSTA-35Semis (SOXX)Energy (XLE)TSMC (TSM)Emerging mkts (EEM)Airlines (JETS)
| Date | Event | Type | Base close | +1d | +5d | +20d | Src |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024-05-23 | PLA 'Joint Sword-2024A' drills | Taiwan drills | 2024-05-22 81.9 | -0.66% | -0.05% | +4.08% | src px |
| 2022-08-02 | Pelosi visits Taiwan; PLA encirclement drills | Taiwan drills | 2022-08-01 100.03 | +0.51% | -3.38% | +5.06% | src px |
| 2025-04-03 | 'Liberation Day' tariffs (first session after the Apr 2 post-close announcement) | Export controls/tariffs | 2025-04-02 74.95 | -6.42% | -12.64% | -17.10% | src px |
| 2023-10-17 | US tightens chip controls | Export controls/tariffs | 2023-10-16 89.65 | +0.28% | +0.20% | -7.95% | src px |
| 2022-10-07 | US advanced-chip export controls on China | Export controls/tariffs | 2022-10-06 94.42 | +3.71% | +0.16% | +0.26% | src px |
| 2019-05-15 | Huawei added to the Entity List | Export controls/tariffs | 2019-05-14 71.24 | +0.74% | +1.32% | -15.82% | src px |
| 2018-03-22 | Section 301 China tariffs announced | Export controls/tariffs | 2018-03-21 69.47 | -0.81% | +0.09% | +6.20% | src px |
| 2025-10-23 | US sanctions Rosneft and Lukoil (first session after the post-close announcement) | Sanctions | 2025-10-22 62.59 | +5.43% | +3.72% | +1.47% | src px |
| 2022-12-05 | G7 price cap on Russian oil | Sanctions | 2022-12-02 85.57 | -3.38% | -11.07% | -4.06% | src px |
| 2022-02-28 | SWIFT cut-off and freeze of Russian central-bank reserves | Sanctions | 2022-02-25 97.93 | +3.12% | +20.61% | +23.20% | src px |
| 2014-07-29 | EU/US sectoral sanctions on Russia | Sanctions | 2014-07-28 107.57 | +0.14% | -2.01% | -4.57% | src px |
| 2018-11-05 | US re-imposes Iran oil sanctions | Sanctions | 2018-11-02 72.83 | +0.47% | -3.64% | -15.30% | src px |
| 2018-05-08 | US exits the Iran nuclear deal | Sanctions | 2018-05-07 76.17 | -1.73% | +2.70% | -1.04% | src px |
| 2026-10-13 | Houthi strike hits Aramco HQ in Dhahran | Shipping/energy hit | 2026-10-12 106.65 | -0.90% | +2.72% | n/a | src px |
| 2026-07-20 | Houthis announce blockade of Saudi-linked ships | Shipping/energy hit | 2026-07-17 88.1 | +1.27% | +9.85% | +0.48% | src px |
| 2024-01-12 | US–UK strikes on the Houthis | Shipping/energy hit | 2024-01-11 77.41 | +1.14% | +1.49% | +6.17% | src px |
| 2023-12-18 | Carriers pause Red Sea transits | Shipping/energy hit | 2023-12-15 76.55 | +1.83% | +3.29% | +1.74% | src px |
| 2023-11-19 | Houthis seize the Galaxy Leader | Shipping/energy hit | 2023-11-17 80.61 | +2.12% | -0.04% | -5.04% | src px |
| 2019-09-14 | Drone/missile attack on Saudi Abqaiq | Shipping/energy hit | 2019-09-13 60.22 | +14.61% | +6.74% | +0.48% | src px |
| 2019-06-13 | Gulf of Oman tanker attacks | Shipping/energy hit | 2019-06-12 59.97 | +2.23% | +3.08% | +10.92% | src px |
| 2025-06-22 | US strikes Fordow, Natanz, Isfahan | Strike exchange | 2025-06-20 77.01 | -7.18% | -12.00% | -10.04% | src px |
| 2025-06-13 | Israel strikes Iran's nuclear and military sites | Strike exchange | 2025-06-12 69.36 | +7.02% | +11.03% | +1.44% | src px |
| 2024-10-26 | Israel's retaliatory strikes on Iran | Strike exchange | 2024-10-25 76.05 | -6.09% | -3.88% | -1.16% | src px |
| 2024-10-01 | Iran ballistic-missile barrage on Israel | Strike exchange | 2024-09-30 71.77 | +2.49% | +12.76% | -0.49% | src px |
| 2024-09-27 | Israel kills Hassan Nasrallah | Strike exchange | 2024-09-26 71.6 | +0.53% | +8.41% | +3.88% | src px |
| 2024-04-13 | Iran's first direct attack on Israel | Strike exchange | 2024-04-12 90.45 | -0.39% | -3.49% | -8.47% | src px |
| 2020-01-03 | US kills Qasem Soleimani | Strike exchange | 2020-01-02 66.25 | +3.55% | -1.33% | -12.21% | src px |
| 2018-04-14 | US/UK/France strikes on Syria | Strike exchange | 2018-04-13 72.58 | -1.60% | +2.04% | +6.26% | src px |
| 2017-04-07 | US missile strike on Syria's Shayrat airbase | Strike exchange | 2017-04-06 54.89 | +0.64% | +1.82% | -10.55% | src px |
| 2026-02-28 | US–Israel strikes on Iran begin a regional war | War outbreak | 2026-02-27 72.48 | +7.26% | +27.88% | +55.31% | src px |
| 2023-10-07 | Hamas attack on Israel | War outbreak | 2023-10-06 84.58 | +4.22% | +7.46% | +0.37% | src px |
| 2022-02-24 | Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine | War outbreak | 2022-02-23 96.84 | +2.31% | +16.62% | +25.57% | src px |
| 2014-02-27 | Russia seizes Crimea | War outbreak | 2014-02-26 109.52 | -0.51% | -1.61% | -2.27% | src px |
| 2008-08-08 | Russia–Georgia war | War outbreak | 2008-08-07 117.86 | -3.84% | -3.55% | -11.68% | src px |
| 2006-07-12 | Israel–Hezbollah war begins | War outbreak | 2006-07-11 74.16 | +1.07% | -0.84% | +2.90% | src px |
| 2003-03-20 | US-led invasion of Iraq | War outbreak | 2003-03-19 29.88 | -4.25% | -4.18% | -2.34% | src px |
| 2001-09-11 | 9/11 attacks (US markets reopen Sep 17) | War outbreak | 2001-09-10 27.63 | +6.88% | -3.76% | -15.53% | src px |
| 1991-01-17 | Desert Storm air campaign begins | War outbreak | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | src px |
| 1990-08-02 | Iraq invades Kuwait | War outbreak | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | src px |
04 · Exposure checker which live situations hit your book?
Pick the assets you hold or trade. For each live situation we take its historical analog event types and compute the median move and hit rate for your assets.
Oil (Brent/WTI)GoldUS defense (ITA)US dollar (DXY)S&P 500VIX (pts)USD/ILSTA-35Semis (SOXX)Energy (XLE)TSMC (TSM)Emerging mkts (EEM)Airlines (JETS)
Horizon:+1d+5d+20d
| Live situation (analogs) | Oil (Brent/WTI) | US defense (ITA) | S&P 500 | TA-35 | Sensitivity* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Red Sea / Bab el-Mandeb: Houthi–Saudi war Shipping/energy hit | +3.08% ↑86% n=7 | +0.84% ↑86% n=7 | +0.75% ↑57% n=7 | +2.17% ↑71% n=7 | 1.71 |
| Taiwan Strait & AI-chip controls Taiwan drills + Export controls/tariffs | +0.09% ↑57% n=7 | -2.09% ↑29% n=7 | -1.99% ↑29% n=7 | +1.31% ↑57% n=7 | 1.37 |
| Israel–Hezbollah & the 27 Oct Israeli election Strike exchange | +1.82% ↑56% n=9 | +1.13% ↑78% n=9 | -1.15% ↑33% n=9 | +0.25% ↑56% n=9 | 1.09 |
| Russia–Ukraine: talks track vs strike war Sanctions + War outbreak | -1.23% ↑43% n=14 | +2.45% ↑67% n=12 | -0.01% ↑50% n=16 | -0.03% ↑50% n=14 | 0.93 |
| US/Israel–Iran: ceasefire & Strait of Hormuz Strike exchange + War outbreak | -0.84% ↑47% n=17 | +1.74% ↑73% n=15 | -0.79% ↑42% n=19 | -0.12% ↑47% n=17 | 0.87 |
| *Sensitivity = average absolute median % move of your selected assets (excluding VIX) across that situation's analog events. Small samples: treat as orientation, not prediction. |
Covered assets only: arbitrary tickers need a market-data API and are planned.
05 · Live pulse Israel incident desk · embedded from israelfeeds.com
Live sources
- Israel Feeds: rocket alerts, incident ledger, source-weighted threat level
- The Two Straits: weekly Red Sea and Hormuz game-theory dashboard
- Polymarket: odds on this page refresh every 60s
Static vs live: live = prediction-market odds (in your browser, every 60s) and the Israel Feeds embed. Static = price tape and base rates (snapshot built 2026-10-25 06:36 IDT from Yahoo Finance daily closes), situation briefs and the calendar (written 22 Oct 2026 from the cited reports).
Shock Radar newsletter
Weekly: ranked geopolitical narratives, crowd odds vs our calls, next week's catalysts.
00 · Shock Radar #1 weekly · 22 Oct 2026 · Subscribe to Shock Radar → · back to live board ↑
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| GEOSHOCKBOARD / SHOCK RADAR SHOCK RADAR EDITION #1 22 OCT 2026 • EVIDENCE WINDOW 15–22 OCT Published 22 Oct 2026. Brent and Hormuz figures refresh from their sources on every build (Brent as of 23 Oct, Hormuz flows as of 21 Oct); other figures are as of the date shown. Corrected 25 Oct: see corrections. THESIS | Energy chokepoints, not front lines, are where geopolitics is being priced: Hormuz and Saudi infrastructure carry the risk premium, while the market prices the ceasefires as more likely to break than hold by year-end. | ||||
| --- | --- | --- | ||
| --- | ||||
| 28.5%<br><br>US–Iran ceasefire holds to Dec 31<br><br>POLYMARKET · AS OF 22 OCT 09:19 IDT · T1 | ||||
| --- | ||||
| −26%<br><br>Hormuz flows vs pre-war<br><br>KPLER 7D AVG 12,653 KBD · AS OF 21 OCT (BRIEFING 23 OCT) · T1 | ||||
| --- | ||||
| +6.2%<br><br>Brent Dec '26, 16 Oct→23 Oct<br><br>109.86 → 116.72 SETTLE · AS OF 23 OCT · BZZ26.NYM · T1 | ||||
| 01 / RANKED NARRATIVES Evidence scores /10 (editorial) · not return forecasts | ||||
| --- | --- | --- | ||
| --- | --- | --- | ||
| 01 | HORMUZ AS BARGAINING CHIP (US–IRAN) CAPITAL Brent Dec '26 +6.2% on the week to $116.72 (16 Oct→23 Oct settles, Yahoo BZZ26.NYM); crowd odds the US–Iran ceasefire survives to Dec 31 were 28.5% (73.5% to Oct 31) on Polymarket as of 22 Oct. BEHAVIOR Iran conditions reopening on its 7-day package (blockade lifted, sanctions eased, assets released); ≥18 vessels reportedly attacked in 2 weeks; talks run via Pakistan/Qatar. Veto: a sequenced blockade-for-reopening deal, with Hormuz flows back near the 17,147 kbd pre-war baseline (Kpler media briefing, 23 Oct 2026). Sources: Arab News · Kpler · Polymarket | 9.5 ↑↑ | ||
| --- | --- | --- | ||
| 02 | SAUDI OIL INFRASTRUCTURE UNDER FIRE CAPITAL Houthi strike on Aramco HQ in Dhahran (13 Oct); Bab el-Mandeb 'effectively closed by Dec 31' priced at 15.5% (Polymarket, as of 22 Oct). BEHAVIOR Drone attack attempt on Shaybah kills 2; US orders non-emergency staff out of Saudi Arabia; Egypt votes on 26 Oct on military support. Veto: a Saudi–Houthi ceasefire (30.5% by Dec 31 on Polymarket as of 22 Oct) or Houthi targeting staying narrow. Sources: Kpler · Khaleej Times · L'Orient Today | 9.0 ↑↑ | ||
| --- | --- | --- | ||
| 03 | ISRAEL'S ELECTION SETS THE IRAN/LEBANON PATH CAPITAL Polymarket next-PM race as of 22 Oct: Eisenkot 50.1% (market label 'Gadi Eizenkot'), Netanyahu 26.5%, Bennett 16%; TA-35 4,156.68 → 4,212.13 (15→21 Oct). BEHAVIOR Netanyahu says regime overthrow is the order given to the army; Lebanon–Israel military-technical talks at CENTCOM in Tampa; Hezbollah reportedly rebuilding in Beirut. Veto: the vote is delayed, or a coalition commits to the US-sequenced Lebanon framework. Sources: L'Orient Today · Anadolu · Algemeiner | 8.5 ↑ | ||
| --- | --- | --- | ||
| 04 | RED SEA BOXES RETURN DESPITE RISK CAPITAL Container carriers are steadily returning through Suez; Freightos expects full recovery in Q1. BEHAVIOR Houthi blockade of Saudi-linked ships in force since 20 Jul (6 ships attacked); Saudi-backed forces retook Mocha. Veto: a Houthi hit on a non-Saudi container ship. Sources: Freightos · World Ports Org | 7.5 → | ||
| --- | --- | --- | ||
| 05 | UKRAINE: TALKS ABOUT TALKS CAPITAL Ceasefire agreement by Dec 31 priced at 20.5%; peace talks held by Nov 30 at 64% (Polymarket, as of 22 Oct). BEHAVIOR Putin 'in principle' ready for trilateral talks after Nov 10; the Kremlin sees little 'substance'; strikes continue on both sides. Veto: talks actually convene with a ceasefire sequence on the table. Sources: CNA · DW · Polymarket | 6.5 → | ||
| --- | --- | --- | ||
| 06 | TAIWAN CHIP-CONTROL ALIGNMENT CAPITAL SOXX 519.42 → 510.36 (14→21 Oct); China blockade of Taiwan in 2026 priced at 2.1% (Polymarket, as of 22 Oct). BEHAVIOR Taiwan plans to add AI servers and advanced chips to its export-control list; once in force, unlicensed shipments to China could be prosecuted under the Foreign Trade Act. No bill or implementation date yet (Bloomberg Law, Taiwan News, 16 Oct). The PLA's Nov–Dec drill season is ahead. Veto: the rule is delayed indefinitely, or a Trump–Xi APEC deal loosens controls. Sources: Bloomberg Law, 16 Oct · Taiwan News, 16 Oct | 6.0 ↑ | ||
| 02 / SIGNAL VS NOISE | ||||
| --- | --- | |||
| --- | ||||
| SIGNAL Attacks on ships and Saudi oil sites (Kpler, Khaleej Times); Hormuz flow data; Brent +6.2% on the week (Dec '26, as of 23 Oct); US staff drawdown from Saudi Arabia; Egypt's war-powers vote set for a date. | ||||
| --- | ||||
| NOISE Campaign rhetoric on 'overthrowing' Iran (pre-election, costless); 'closest we've been' on Ukraine (no concession attached); routine PLA drills described as 'not directed at any country'. | ||||
| 03 / HISTORY SAYS | ||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Analog type (+5 sessions, median · hit rate) | Oil | ITA | S&P 500 | TA-35 |
| Shipping/energy hits (n=7) | +3.08% · 86%↑ | +0.84% · 86%↑ | +0.75% · 57%↑ | +2.17% · 71%↑ |
| Strike exchanges (n=9) | +1.82% · 56%↑ | +1.13% · 78%↑ | −1.15% · 33%↑ | +0.25% · 56%↑ |
| Export controls/tariffs (n=5) | +0.16% · 80%↑ | −2.30% · 40%↑ | −3.58% · 20%↑ | −1.87% · 40%↑ |
| Shipping hits have been the most reliable oil signal; after strike exchanges the S&P 500 dipped at +5 sessions but rose at +20 sessions in 89% of cases (median +1.94%). Dataset: 39 events 1990–2026, Yahoo Finance daily closes; full playbook. Small samples; the past does not predict. | ||||
| 04 / NEXT WEEK • 23–30 OCT (+ early Nov) | ||||
| --- | --- | |||
| 26 Oct | Egypt parliament votes on military support for Saudi Arabia | |||
| 27 Oct | Israeli election | |||
| 31 Oct | Polymarket ceasefire markets 'through Oct 31' resolve | |||
| 1 Nov | OPEC+ (7 countries) meeting on December output | |||
| 3 Nov | US midterms |
Sources and the full 60-day calendar: geoshockboard.vercel.app/#cal |
| | |
| --- |
| HIGHEST CONVICTION / HORMUZ AS BARGAINING CHIP
The crowd gives the US–Iran ceasefire only 28.5% to survive the year, while Hormuz flows at ~74% of the pre-war baseline (Kpler 7-day avg 12,653 kbd vs 17,147; flows as of 21 Oct, briefing 23 Oct). Watch costly moves (strikes, sinkings, blockade sequencing), not campaign rhetoric: those decide whether oil's risk premium widens or collapses. | |
| Evidence window 15–22 Oct 2026 · Prices: Yahoo Finance · Odds: Polymarket, 22 Oct 09:19 IDT · Market context, not investment advice. GSB SR #1 · 2026.10.22 | |
07 · Track record every GeoShockBoard call vs the crowd · Brier score at resolution
| Logged | Call | Ours | Crowd at log | Crowd now | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-22 | US–Iran ceasefire holds through Dec 31 | 30% | 28.5% | 28.5% | open |
| 2026-10-22 | Hormuz traffic back to normal by Dec 31 | 8% | 11.5% | 11.5% | open |
| 2026-10-22 | US invades Iran before 2027 | 5% | 15.5% | 19.5% | open |
| 2026-10-22 | Bab el-Mandeb effectively closed by Dec 31 | 10% | 15.5% | 16.5% | open |
| 2026-10-22 | Saudi–Houthi ceasefire announced by Dec 31 | 20% | 30.5% | 20.5% | open |
| 2026-10-22 | Perim Island out of Houthi control by Dec 31 | 20% | 20.5% | 20.5% | open |
| 2026-10-22 | Israeli military action against Beirut by Oct 31 | 10% | 12.5% | 7.0% | open |
| 2026-10-22 | Hezbollah disarms by Dec 31 | 3% | 5% | 5.5% | open |
| 2026-10-22 | Ceasefire agreement by Dec 31 | 10% | 20% | 16.5% | open |
| 2026-10-22 | Peace talks held by Nov 30 | 60% | 64% | 75.5% | open |
| 2026-10-22 | Peace deal signed before 2027 | 5% | 9.5% | 10.0% | open |
| 2026-10-22 | China blockades Taiwan in 2026 | 2% | 2.1% | 2.5% | open |
| 2026-10-22 | China–Taiwan military clash before 2027 | 4% | 3.5% | 3.3% | open |
| 2026-10-22 | China invades Taiwan by end-2026 | 1% | 2.1% | 2.1% | open |
| 2026-10-23 | US–Iran ceasefire holds through Dec 31 | 20% | 32% | 28.5% | open |
| 2026-10-23 | Saudi–Houthi ceasefire announced by Dec 31 | 15% | 30.5% | 20.5% | open |
| 2026-10-24 | Peace talks held by Nov 30 | 70% | 75% | 75.5% | open |
17 calls logged, 0 resolved. Brier scores (ours vs crowd) appear here as markets resolve; first resolutions are due 31 Oct.
06 · Sponsor the board
Reach macro traders, risk leads and analysts at the moment they are pricing geopolitical risk. Placements: situation sponsor (one flashpoint card), playbook data partner (your data with attribution: odds, shipping, insurance, FX), newsletter sponsor. Good fits: brokers, prediction markets, shipping and insurance data, risk intelligence. Sponsor contact opens soon.
GeoShockBoard is market context, not investment advice. Nothing here is a recommendation to buy or sell any security or contract. Data: Yahoo Finance chart API (daily closes), Polymarket Gamma API (public odds), and the news sources cited in each item. Verify before relying on any figure.